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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this sentencing appeal, we are presented with the 
dilemma of sentencing a courier who brought a large 
quantity of drugs into the country but who, from the very 
inception of the transaction, was cooperating with the 
authorities, to whom he revealed his plans. The District 
Court rejected Warren's plea for special probation and, 
instead, departed upward to the maximum statutory 
penalty. Warren challenges the adequacy of notice of the 
District Court's upward departure and the sufficiency of the 
evidence supporting the grounds given for the upward 
departure, as well as the imposition of restrictions on his 
travel outside of the United States as a special condition of 






Prior to his involvement in this matter, Joseph B. Warren 
had been regularly employed with real estate, investment, 
and computer and internet companies, primarily in Israel, 
since his graduation from Cornell University in 1992. On 
June 30, 1998, Warren telephoned the Drug Enforcement 
Administration ("DEA") in Belgium, identifying himself as 
"Jack." Warren stated that he was in Israel, and that he 
had been propositioned by a drug trafficker, known only as 
"Sammy," to act as a courier to transport ecstasy, an illegal 
"designer drug," from Belgium to New York City and/or 
cocaine from Panama to Europe. Warren claimed he had 
never been involved in this type of activity before but 
"became interested" after he was offered $15,000 for the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Warren has raised two issues in a pro se  submission: 1) he should be 
allowed to withdraw his plea; 2) his conduct is not a violation of 
criminal 
law. We have examined these arguments and determined that they are 
without merit. 
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task. In the course of his initial conversations with the 
DEA, he expressed his desire to cooperate with law 
enforcement officials, and a special agent informed him that 
no plan could be devised until Warren was able to provide 
additional names or until details were confirmed. Warren 
said he would call again once he had more information. 
 
On July 8, 1998, Warren arrived in Belgium and called 
the special agent, and the two men met. Warren reported to 
the DEA agent in the course of their meeting that he 
needed the money he was to receive as a drug courier 
"because he was several hundred thousand dollars in debt 
as the result of bank frauds and dealings with Israelis 
involved in vehicle thefts." Presentence Report ("PSR") P 9. 
Warren also reported that a flight reservation had been 
made for him on July 9, 1998. He had been told that the 
suitcase he was meant to deliver would be brought to his 
hotel in Brussels on the morning of July 9, 1998. 
 
After debriefing Warren, the DEA agent called a federal 
customs agent in the United States to arrange for a 
controlled delivery. Customs agreed to assist, provided 
Warren was to arrive in Newark on July 13, and not July 
9. Warren declined to follow this course of action, believing 
that it placed him in danger. The special agent then advised 
Warren to walk away from the situation, warning that a 
"lookout" would be placed on him at United States airports, 
and he would be stopped and searched if he tried to enter 
the United States. Warren stated that he would not 
continue his interactions with the drug traffickers and 
would return to the United States or Israel. On July 9, 
1998, Warren arrived in Newark International Airport and 
approached immigration officials. He stated that he had 
drugs in his possession, and customs inspectors found a 
large quantity of pills in his luggage. The drugs were seized, 
and a lab report indicated that Warren turned over 
21,269.2 tablets of ecstasy. Warren was arrested and 
charged with importation of a controlled substance, but he 




2. The rationale for prosecuting a courier who cooperates with the 
authorities from the outset escapes us, but it is not for the federal 
courts 
to second-guess the U.S. Attorney's Office on its prosecutorial decisions. 
See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 
380-83 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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The PSR noted that where the base offense level under 
2D2.1 applies, a potential ground for an upward departure 
may exist under Application Note 1, on the basis that the 
drugs were not intended for use by that defendant. The PSR 
also noted that the large amount of drugs Warren had 
carried placed his case outside of the "heartland" of the 
Guidelines, and that in such a case, an upward departure 
would be appropriate pursuant to section 5K2.0. Warren 
objected to the PSR in a written submission, but he did not 
object or argue that objection in the course of the 
sentencing hearing itself. 
 
The PSR paints a picture of Warren as an intelligent 
young man, the product of a supportive environment with 
strong family and religious ties, who had not previously had 
any dealings with the criminal justice system. While 
regretting his conduct and accepting responsibility, Warren 
nonetheless indicated to the probation officer that he had 
not considered the possibility of spending any time in jail 
since he was "not a criminal" and was trying to help the 
police. At sentencing, Warren's attorney asked for special 
probation on the grounds that Warren had no prior 
criminal record, had the potential for a "bright future," had 
accepted responsibility for his actions, and had already 
spent two months in jail during the pendency of the case. 
The District Court viewed the situation differently, and 
departed upward, sentencing Warren to the statutory 
maximum punishment of 5 years probation. The District 
Court's stated basis for its ruling was twofold:first, that the 
drugs were not for personal consumption, and second, that 
Warren had a history of criminal conduct. The crucial 
portion of the sentencing transcript reads as follows: 
 
       Despite warnings to you, clear, unequivocal warnings, 
       you chose to board a plane to this country and carry 
       6,239 grams of Ecstasy with you, an extraordinary 
       amount of drugs. Clearly not for personal 
       consumption. As I've said, a one year term of probation 
       and expungement of your record is insufficient given 
       the circumstances of this case; the warnings that were 
       given to you, the entire volitional conduct. The unusual 
       circumstances were taken into consideration by the 
       Government when affording you this plea. Again, 
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       although I recognize I have the right to do this, I reject 
       it, utterly reject it. 
 
       I'm going to place you on probation, but I'm going to do 
       so pursuant to an upward departure that these drugs 
       were not for personal consumption, and I make that 
       finding in light of the amount, extraordinary amount of 
       drugs you carried into this country. The fact that as 
       you candidly indicate in the presentence report, 
       paragraph nine . . . you needed money because you 
       were several hundred thousand dollars in debt as a 
       result of bank frauds and dealings with Israel, also 
       involved in vehicle thefts. You have a history of 
       criminal conduct by your own admission. You need 
       supervision. Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 
       1984, and Section 5K2.0, it is my judgment that you 
       are placed on probation for a period of five years. . . . 
       You are to refrain from applying for a passport and 
       restrict your travel to the United States. A. at 76-77. 
 
Warren had a criminal history category of I, so the 
District Court's decision to depart upward added four 
offense levels to Warren's offense calculation, taking it from 
two to six, to impose the five years of probation. See 
S 5B1.2(a)(1). The government argues that the District 
Court was justified in its upward departure under section 
2D2.1 based on the defendant's intent not to consume the 
drugs personally. Warren argues that the District Court 
improperly departed upward based on section 2D2.1, but 
also based upon uncharged criminal conduct. We conclude 
that both grounds were relied upon by the District Court in 
its departure decision. 
 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. S 3742. A District Court's decision to depart 
under the Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, and deferential review is accorded to the extent 
of the departure. See United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 
862, 871 (3d Cir. 1997). If no objection was made, review 
is for plain error. See United States v. Paslay, 971 F.2d 667, 
674 n.13 (11th Cir. 1992). The imposition of a special 
condition of probation or supervised release is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion, but absent an objection, review is 
for plain error.  See United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 
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127 (3d Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed , (U.S. June 19, 
1999) (No. 98-9838); United States v. Fabiano , 169 F.3d 
1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1999), petition for cert.filed, (U.S. 
June 3, 1999) (No. 98-9770); United States v. Voda, 994 




A. Upward Departure 
 
Warren challenges the upward departure on a variety of 
grounds. First, he claims that the District Court did not 
articulate reasons for its departure. We disagree. The 
District Court did articulate reasons for its upward 
departure. He also contends that the evidence before the 
District Court did not provide a sufficient basis for either 
ground of the upward departure. As we discuss more fully 
below, we agree with Warren's contentions. He also argues 
that he did not have adequate notice of the grounds for the 
upward departure. We do not need to reach this argument, 
given our agreement with his view that the upward 
departure itself was not supported by the record. 
 
1. Upward Departure Based on Quantity of Drugs under 
       Section 2D2.1 or Section 5K2.0 
 
In departing upward, the District Court relied in part 
upon Application Note 1 to Section 2D2.1, which states: 
 
       The typical case addressed by this guideline involves 
       possession of a controlled substance for the 
       defendant's own consumption. Where the 
       circumstances establish intended consumption by a 
       person other than the defendant, an upward departure 
       may be warranted. 
 
Therefore, a court may consider an upward departure if 
a defendant is charged with possession of a controlled 
substance and the "circumstances establish intended 
consumption by a person other than the defendant." In 
other words, the departure would be appropriate if it is 
shown, or can be inferred, that the defendant intends to do 
something more than merely possess the drugs. Warren 
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argues that he was only trying to help the police and did 
not intend that the drugs would be distributed on the 
street. Therefore, he contends, Application Note 1 to Section 
2D2.1 does not apply to him, because that Guideline 
provision is meant to apply to persons who intend to 
distribute or share the drugs they bring into the country. 
Although Warren did not object to the imposition of the 
upward departure at the sentencing hearing, we find that 
he adequately preserved his objections to the upward 
departure under section 2D2.1 via his response to the PSR. 
See United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1193 (3d Cir. 
1994). As a result, we will review this departure 
determination for abuse of discretion. See Baird , 109 F.3d 
at 862, 871. 
 
The government argues that: 1) the Application Note to 
Section 2D2.1 is an encouraged factor under the 
Guidelines, and hence serves an acceptable basis for 
departure under a reading of the circumstances of the case; 
or 2) that the sheer quantity of drugs alone is a sufficient 
ground for an upward departure under Koon, as the 
quantity of drugs possessed takes Warren's case outside of 
the "heartland" of drug possession cases. 3 In so arguing, 
the government relies on prior statements by this court 
indicating that quantity alone can serve as an appropriate 
ground for an upward departure when a defendant has 
been charged with possession of a controlled substance. 
See United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 990 n.4* (3d 
Cir. 1992); United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 608-10 (3d 
Cir. 1989). Other courts have also indicated that an upward 
departure based upon drug quantity alone is appropriate in 
drug possession cases. See United States v. Vasquez, 909 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. If a particular factor is not mentioned in the guidelines, that does 
not 
mean that departure on the basis of that factor is precluded. Rather, 
Koon "authorizes district courts to depart in cases that feature 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances of a kind or degree not 
adequately taken into consideration by the commission" in formulating 
guidelines to apply to a "heartland" of cases. Koon v. United States, 518 
U.S. 81, 94 (1996). A sentencing court is free to consider, in an unusual 
case, whether or not the factors that make it unusual are present in 
sufficient kind or degree to warrant a departure. See, e.g., United States 
v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 224 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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F.2d 235, 242 (7th Cir. 1990) ("an upward departure from 
the guideline for simple possession of narcotics, which does 
not refer to drug quantity, may be based on drug quantity 
where the amount possessed is atypical"); United States v. 
Crawford, 883 F.2d 963, 964 (11th Cir. 1989); cf. United 
States v. Correa-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1988). As 
such, the government argues that Warren's ultimate 
intention to turn the drugs over to law enforcement does 
not matter, for he also intended to do so on his own terms. 
 
Although the above cases reflect several courts' 
willingness to look to the quantity of drugs involved when 
departing upward in drug possession cases, these cases 
have neither relied on nor interpreted Application Note 1 of 
Section 2D2.1. In turning to the case at hand, wefirst 
observe the notable absence of case law interpreting 
Application Note 1 of section 2D2.1 since the guidelines 
were amended to include it in 1997. We surmise that this 
lack of discussion is because the language and import of 
this particular note are clear, dictating that in the case of 
a simple possession offense, a district court should also 
look to the circumstances presented by the record before it 
to determine whether an upward departure is warranted. 
This record contains no evidence of "circumstances" that 
establish intended consumption by another within the 
meaning of Application Note 1. Rather, the record evidence 
of intent consists of proof that Warren had no intent to do 
anything with the drugs other than turn them over to law 
enforcement authorities. That he was not compliant with 
the government's preferred modus operandi in terms of 
when and where he was to turn the drugs over does not 
alter the fact that the record is devoid of any evidence that 
would be probative of intent by Warren to distribute or 
share the ecstasy carried in the suitcase. In the face of this 
lack of evidence, and in the face of actual proof of intent to 
turn in the drugs to the government, the quantity of drugs 
lacks significance for purposes of sentencing. 
 
In so stating, we are not contravening the statements we 
have made in Collado and Ryan regarding drug quantity 
and the propriety of upward departures based on quantity 
of drugs under section 5K2.0. Large quantities of drugs can 
clearly take a routine possession case out of the heartland, 
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and thereby justify a departure under section 5K2.0. 
However, the rationale for distinguishing such an offense 
from the "heartland" of possession cases is not dependent 
on quantity per se, but, rather, on what quantity connotes. 
See Ryan, 866 F.2d at 605 (departure based upon quantity, 
packaging, and purity of drugs). Large quantities of drugs 
are relevant to sentencing determinations in possession 
cases only to the extent that they indicate the high 
probability that the drugs were intended not for mere 
possession, but for distribution to others. However, where 
the sole evidence of intent negates the normal inferences to 
be drawn from the sheer quantity of drugs possessed, the 
inferences that may normally be permissibly drawn from 
quantity are improper. In this case, the record evidence is 
unequivocal that not only did Warren not intend that 
anyone consume the drugs he carried, but also that he 
intended to turn those drugs over to government agents 
and did so. In such a situation, we conclude that the 
District Court abused its discretion in utilizing Application 
Note 1 of Section 2D2.1 or 5K2.0 as a basis for an upward 
departure based on quantity of drugs. 
 
2. Evidentiary Basis of Criminal Conduct as a Basis for 
       the Upward Departure 
 
Warren also attacks the District Court's reliance on a 
paragraph in the PSR as the evidentiary basis for the other 
ground for upward departure, namely uncharged criminal 
conduct. As he did not object to the upward departure 
based on uncharged criminal conduct, he must 
demonstrate plain error. See United States v. Dozier, 119 
F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 1997). The government argues that 
a court may consider any information concerning the 
background, character, and conduct of the defendant in 
sentencing a defendant, and that the information regarding 
his other criminal activity was properly considered by the 
District Court. U.S.S.G. S 1B1.4; U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, 4(b). 
While we do permit reference to such information in 
sentencing a defendant, a district court should consider 
only reliable information about the defendant and his 
background and character. Although the Federal Rules of 
Evidence do not apply in sentencing proceedings, 
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information "used as a basis for sentencing under the 
Guidelines must have `sufficient indicia of reliability to 
support its probable accuracy.' " United States v. Miele, 989 
F.2d 659, 664 (3d Cir. 1993). We have stated that this 
standard should be applied rigorously. See United States v. 
Brothers, 75 F.3d 845, 848 (3d Cir. 1996). In analyzing an 
upward departure, we must therefore assure ourselves that 
such a departure rests on a reliable evidentiary basis. See 
Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156, 162 (3d Cir. 1998), citing 
United States v. Cammisano, 917 F.2d 1057, 1061 (8th Cir. 
1990); United States v. Cantu-Dominguez, 898 F.2d 968, 
970-71 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 
In sentencing Warren on the basis of uncharged criminal 
conduct, the District Court appears to have relied entirely 
on paragraph nine of the PSR, which stated: "During the 
meeting [with a DEA agent] Warren claimed he was to 
receive $15,000 for acting as a drug courier, and that he 
needed the money because he was several hundred 
thousand dollars in debt as the result of bank frauds and 
dealings with Israelis involved in vehicle thefts." By its own 
terms, the statement is equivocal; it is unclear therefrom 
whether Warren was the perpetrator or the victim of the 
frauds recited. The statement is not attributed or sworn 
and appears to be second-hand hearsay. A district court 
"can give a high level of credence to hearsay statements" 
and can even credit hearsay over sworn testimony 
"especially where there is other evidence to corroborate the 
inconsistent hearsay statement." See Brothers , 75 F.3d at 
848. This statement, however, whatever its import, is too 
ambiguous and attenuated a basis for this particular 
ground for an upward departure. Neither this statement, 
nor the purported conduct, was the subject of any 
discussion or argument at the sentencing hearing itself; it 
was not detailed or corroborated in any manner. Further, 
the PSR paragraph does not contain sufficient detail or 
other indicia of reliability that would provide an adequate 
basis for the District Court to rely upon it in departing 
upward. This is not to say that a district court can never 
rely on facts set forth in a PSR as the basis for an upward 
departure, but a district court cannot, as here, merely 
extrapolate from such ambiguous statements contained in 
a paragraph in the PSR, without more, as a basis for an 
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upward departure. There should be some offer of proof or 
evidence to accompany that statement before it may form 
the basis for an upward departure. 
 
Because the bases for the upward departure did not have 
sufficient evidentiary support, we will vacate the District 
Court's order and remand for resentencing. In so doing, we 
note another aspect of this case that is apparent from the 
District Court's sentencing colloquy and from the tenor of 
the government's argument on appeal. Both cast the 
defendant in a negative light, and unusually so, 
presumably based on his conduct or attitude in this case. 
While we do not condone Warren's actions, we do not view 
them as implicating his credibility in a way that would 
undermine the record regarding his intent. The District 
Court did not voice any criticism directed at his veracity, 
but attacked instead his decision to act on his own, 
contrary to the government's wishes. While Warren's 
position -- that he did not want to walk away from the drug 
dealers, or change his travel date for fear of his own safety 
-- seems plausible, perhaps Warren was playing fast and 
loose with the government, and we do not preclude the 
District Court from permitting further development of the 
record in its discretion, should the argument or questions 
on remand dictate. See United States v. Dickler , 64 F.3d 
818, 831-32 (3d Cir. 1995); see also United States v. 
Walker, 149 F.3d 238, 243 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
B. Travel Restriction as a Special Condition of Probation 
 
Warren also challenges the District Court's imposition of 
a bar to his travel outside of the United States as a special 
condition of his term of his probation. A court may impose 
a special condition of probation to the extent that any such 
condition is reasonably related to factors set forth in 
Section 3553(a)(1) and (2),4 and to the extent that such 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Section 3553(a)(1): the nature and circumstances of the offense, and 
the history and characteristics of the defendant; 
 
Section 3553(a)(2): the need for the sentence imposed (A) to reflect the 
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide 
just punishment for the offense; B) to afford adequate deterrence to 
criminal conduct; C) to protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant; and D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or 
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the 
most effective manner. 
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conditions involve only such deprivations of liberty and 
property as are reasonably necessary to fulfill the purposes 
of probation. 18 U.S.C. S 3563(b). Standard conditions of 
probation include restrictions on a defendant's right to 
travel. See 18 U.S.C. S 3563(b)(13) & (14) (limiting where a 
defendant may reside, and requiring a defendant to remain 
within the jurisdiction of the court unless granted 
permission to leave by the court or a probation officer). 
Courts have also allowed for particularized travel 
restrictions as special conditions of probation. See, e.g., 
United States v. Friedberg, 78 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Pugliese, 960 F.2d 913, 915-16 (10th Cir. 
1992). In determining what constitutes a sufficient record 
to uphold a probation condition, courts have looked to 
whether a court has made any explicit factual findings, or 
to whether the record before the court suggests reasons for 
the restriction that would serve the aims of probation. See 
United States v. Porotsky, 105 F.3d 69, 71-72 (2d Cir. 
1997); Friedberg, 78 F.3d at 96-97; Voda , 994 F.2d at 153.5 
 
As noted above, the courts of appeals have consistently 
required district courts to set forth factual findings to 
justify special probation conditions. In Friedberg, a case 
decided under the Federal Probation Act, the defendant Igor 
Porotsky, a Russian emigre, pled guilty to conspiracy and 
attempted tax evasion from a gasoline bootlegging scheme. 
The defendant had been granted permission to travel to 
Russia prior to his guilty plea, but his requests to travel to 
Russia during the term of his probation had been denied 
without explanation by the district court. See id. at 95-96. 
The district court then denied a travel request on the basis 
that the defendant posed an enhanced risk of flight. See id. 
at 96. On appeal, the court found that the district court 
had not considered whether the denial of the travel request 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Warren argues in passing that he did not receive adequate notice of 
the probation condition. Courts have been reluctant to include 
conditions of supervised release or probation within the disclosure 
requirements of Burns, apart from requiring notice in instances of 
community notification provisions for sex offenders, and we do not see 
a reason to extend the rationale of Burns to cover travel restrictions. 
See, 
e.g., United States v. Coenen, 135 F.3d 938, 940-45 (5th Cir. 1998); 
United States v. Mills, 959 F.2d 516, 518-19 (5th Cir. 1992). 
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served the aims of probation, and remanded with 
instructions to make appropriate factual findings as to 
whether the denial of the travel request served those aims. 
See id. at 96-97; see also Porotsky, 105 F.3d at 72 (finding 
that mere recitation of twin aims of probation by the 
district court was not a sufficient finding for denial of a 
travel request, and remanding with directions for the 
district court to grant the request). Compare United States 
v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 925 F.2d 604, 607-08 (2d Cir. 
1991) (denying defendant permission to travel to Europe to 
pursue job opportunities appropriately satisfied objectives 
of probation). 
 
At the very least, the record below must contain evidence 
that would support the imposition of a special condition of 
probation, even if the district court fails to set forth its 
findings and justifications. In Voda, the defendant had been 
charged with one count of negligent discharge of a pollutant 
and he challenged the court's condition that he not possess 
a firearm during his probation term. The district court had 
given no reason on the record for imposing the condition, 
nor was there any reason suggested by the PSR or apparent 
in the record before the court. See 994 F.2d at 153. The 
court noted that although prohibition of firearm possession 
was a permissible discretionary condition of probation, this 
case did not present circumstances that would support the 
imposition of such a prohibition. See id. The court found 
that because the defendant was charged with a nonviolent 
offense, and the PSR did not indicate that he had violent or 
dangerous tendencies, or any past history of aggressive 
behavior, a firearm prohibition was not required to meet the 
purposes of probation. See id. at 153-54. 
 
These cases indicate that in order to impose a special 
condition of probation, a district court should engage in an 
inquiry which results in findings on the record to justify 
that condition, and to indicate how that condition meets 
the statutory purposes of probation. We will affirm only if 
the district court has made such findings, or we can 
determine from the record a sufficient evidentiary basis for 
the special probation condition. In imposing the special 
condition of probation in this case, the District Court did 
not make findings in support of the travel restriction, nor 
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did it indicate how the restriction fit within the statutory 
aims of probation. Further, we cannot, on the record before 
us, ascertain any viable basis for the travel restriction in 
the record before the District Court in order for us to 
proceed to determine, on our own, whether the restriction 
satisfies the aims of probation. Even if we were to assume 
that the probation condition stemmed from Warren's 
alleged prior criminal conduct in Israel, we have found a 
mere reference to this supposed conduct to be an 
insufficient and unreliable basis on which to rest an 
upward departure. The travel restriction in this case suffers 
from a similar insufficiency, as it springs from reasons that 
are not supported in the record below. 
 
While we share the District Court's impression that it 
would probably be in Warren's best interest that he not 
revisit his old "stomping grounds" in Israel, where his 
troubles began, in view of the inadequacy of the record, we 
cannot let the travel restriction stand. Should the District 
Court decide on resentencing that the travel restriction is 
appropriate to meet the aims of probation, it should set 
forth findings that support that conclusion. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the sentence 
and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
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       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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